Critical minerals at COP30: Australia’s strategic moment

Main image: COP30 President Andre Correa do Lago before the start of the conference’s plenary session. Photo by PABLO PORCIUNCULA/AFP via Getty images

COP30 was the first Conference of the Parties (COP) to put critical minerals in the spotlight. Essential to the energy transition, mineral supplies and supply chains are now inextricable from any meaningful climate conversations.

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva set the scene early. Speaking at the World Leaders’ Summit in the week prior to COP30, he told attendees: “We cannot discuss the energy transition without addressing critical minerals, which are essential for the production of batteries, solar panels and energy systems.”

What followed was a critical mineral hokey cokey, as mentions were in and out of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) text. Vocal proponents of the mineral mention included Australia, the EU, the UK, Colombia and several African nations (represented by the African Group of Negotiators). Ultimately, however, Russia and China made sure that critical minerals were out.

The critical minerals in question include lithium, copper, nickel, cobalt and graphite: all essential in batteries, electric vehicles (EVs), grid upgrades and energy storage systems. However, the discovery and extraction of these minerals is mired by difficult environmental, social and governance questions, articulated by protestors across COP30.

Indeed, both Australia and Türkiye (set to be co-hosts of COP31 in 2026) have faced their share of criticism from local communities. Turkish lawmakers passed a controversial new omnibus bill in July permitting the leasing of agricultural olive groves for lignite coal extraction, prompting affected villagers to go on a hunger strike. Meanwhile, in Australia, Rio Tinto’s destruction of the Juukan Gorge sparked anger and distrust between mining companies and indigenous communities, compounded by ongoing disputes around Bravus Mining’s Carmichael coal mine in Queensland and Fortescue's Solomon Hub in the Pilbara Region.

Regardless of the subject’s contention and the ultimate exclusion of critical minerals from the COP30 outcome, the discussion of critical minerals represents significant change.

Melissa Marengo, senior program officer at the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), tells MINE Australia: “Over the past few years, and especially in recent months, minerals have moved from being treated as a traditional extractive resource to being recognised as strategic assets for the global energy transition.”

Critical mineral supply chains have become a question of national security for the world’s biggest economies. Australia has positioned itself tactfully as a West-aligned supplier, boasting the biggest lithium production globally, and the second-largest reserves of copper and cobalt.

Alongside other proponents of mineral inclusion in COP30’s outcome, Australia advocated for the safeguarding of mineral supply chains from weaponisation. Although this didn’t happen in an official format, discussions themselves marked a significant shift.

An initial draft of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Just Transition text, released on 14 November, did in fact mention critical minerals. It included a clause recognising “the social and environmental risks associated with scaling up supply chains for clean energy technologies, including risks arising from the extraction and processing of critical minerals, recalling the principles and recommendations outlined in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals”.

By 17 November, this text was optional. However, hope lingered, as the draft included a new mineral mention, recognising “the importance of developing reliable, diversified, sustainable, transparent and responsible supply chains for clean energy technologies, including through environmentally and socially responsible extraction and processing of critical minerals, and of stakeholder engagement and consultation, including through inclusive community engagement across entire value chains with representatives of industries, businesses, workers and local communities”.

The yo-yoing was not over; by 21 November, the text was out again. When the final text was published on 22 November, all mentions were out. Vetoes came from China and Russia, which were both reported to have been insistent on the dropping of mineral references.

Teresa Anderson, global lead on climate justice at ActionAid International, tells MINE Australia: “It is deeply disappointing that the final words of text on the just transition mechanism don’t specifically refer to the mineral sector,” although she adds that “there is still scope to make sure the work on improving the rights of communities involved in minerals and metals mining takes place”.

Russia is currently the third-biggest producer of nickel, and has significant deposits of copper, rare earth elements and lithium, which it plans to produce at scale by 2030. Meanwhile, China is the leading refiner for 19 out of 20 critical minerals in the energy sector, and dominates the refining sector with a market share of approximately 70%.

China and Russia are both looking inwardly, limiting exports or having them artificially limited by Western sanctions. As they prioritise domestic interests, Australia is emerging as a stabiliser for Western supply chains. By ticking ESG boxes and aligning with Western defence priorities, Australia has become the anti-China option, in what is proving to be a moment of leverage for the country.

Wording is important, but it is political and diplomatic decisions that speak the loudest. Saloni Sachdeva, energy specialist at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, says: “COP30 made progress, but the true embedding of critical mineral supply chain resilience and equitable access is happening through G20 initiatives, bilateral partnerships and national industrial strategies.”

Australia has recently entered into several bilateral partnerships to support new projects; in 2022, India and Australia signed a memorandum of understanding to support Indian investment in Australian critical minerals and to build robust supply chains for minerals including lithium and cobalt. More recently, in October 2025, the US and Australia entered into the US-Australia mineral framework to support the supply of raw and processed critical minerals and rare earths and reduce reliance on China.

Following COP30, Australia and India also joined with Canada in a trilateral partnership (the Australia-Canada-India Technology and Innovation Partnership). Officials will convene in 2026 to work on the initiative, which will focus on green energy innovation and resilient supply chains, with an emphasis on critical minerals.

These relationships are symptomatic of Australia’s international strategy, positioning itself at the heart of the global energy transition as the China alternative. Speaking to the UN General Assembly in September, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described the country as "a nation blessed with the traditional resources, critical minerals, skills, sunlight and space”, adding that it was “working to seize and share the economic opportunities of renewable energy”.

To translate its significant mineral reserves into “economic opportunities”, Australia has entered into several international collaborative critical mineral frameworks, including the Minerals Security Partnership, launched in 2022. It is also a part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which relaunched in 2017 to unite Australia, India, Japan and the US in working towards a prosperous and resilient Indo-Pacific.

Australia will co-host COP31 with Türkiye. It dropped out of the bid to be the host country but, in return, the two countries agreed that Australian Federal Minister for Climate and Energy Chris Bowen will be President of Negotiations at the conference in Antalya in 2026.

He will be responsible for shaping the agenda and presiding over formal negotiations, and critical minerals are therefore expected to be central to COP31 discussions. Bowen has previously commented on Australia’s “enormous mineral wealth”, following an announcement in December 2024 that the Albanese Government would invest $75m (A$112.53m) to boost critical mineral supplies.

He also noted the potential of the country’s resources “to power the world while bringing jobs and wealth back home, especially in regional communities”.

While the exclusion of critical minerals and fossil fuels presented a glaring hole, COP30 was seen as an opportunity to demonstrate international collaboration in the face of global tensions; the term “cooperation” duly appeared 15 times across the final global mutirão (“group collaboration”) text.

One perceived success of the conference was the creation of the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM), developed under the UAE JTWP. The JTWP began implementation at COP28 (hosted by the UAE); however, it has so far consisted of regular dialogues but little substantial action.

BAM is intended to offer accountability. Tasneem Essop, executive director at Climate Action Network International, comments: “We came here to get the Belém Action Mechanism – for families, for workers, for communities […] Governments must now honour this Just Transition mechanism with real action. Anything less is a betrayal of people – and of the Paris promise.”

The primary objective of the Paris Agreement (signed at COP21 in 2015) is to limit global warming to well below 2°C, but the document also outlines “the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities”.

Climate control and the transition are inextricable, and Marengo explains that “meeting the goals of the Paris Agreement requires a massive surge in demand for transition minerals. Mineral-producing countries are therefore indispensable to meeting global supply projections – but these expectations – to supply more and supply faster – are passed from international markets to national governments, and ultimately to local territories.

“Greater pressure does not necessarily translate into fairer policies or a shift away from old extractive paradigms. Quite the opposite: it often generates a sense of urgency where procedures are accelerated, standards relaxed and communities sidelined.”

Proponents of BAM hope the framework will bridge the gap between communities and commodities. It sits as part of the broader Belém Package, which consists of 29 decisions, accepted by 195 Parties. It will support the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and is intended to act as a platform to coordinate strategies, mobilise resources and monitor progress.

Anderson called BAM “a major legacy”, and “a huge win for the workers, women and civil society groups who came pleading for a framework to ensure climate action also protects jobs and makes lives better”.

Outside of BAM, the package also agreed to mobilise $1.3tn annually for climate action by 2035; triple adaptation finance by the same year; and launch the Global Implementation Accelerator, a voluntary initiative supporting the implementation of countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans.

The package also includes the Belém Mission to 1.5°C, which will drive ambition in NDCs through dialogue and investment cooperation.